ABSTRACT Recently, an image encryption scheme combining bit-plane extraction with multiple chaotic maps (IESBC) was proposed. The scheme extracts binary bit planes from the plain-image and performs bitlevel permutation and confusion, which are controlled by a pseudo-random sequence and a random image generated by the Logistic map, respectively. As the rows and columns of the four MSBPs are permuted with the same pseudo-random sequence and the encryption process does not involve the statistical characteristics of the plain-image, the equivalent secret key of IESBC can be disclosed in the scenario of known/chosenplaintext attacks. This paper analyzes the weak points of IESBC and proposes a known-plaintext attack and a chosen-plaintext attack on it. Furthermore, we proposed an enhanced scheme to fix the shortcomings and resist the proposed plaintext attacks. The experimental simulation results demonstrated that the enhanced scheme is excellent in terms of various cryptographic metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of network communication, information security technology has entered a comprehensive digital era [1] . Digital image is one of the most popular information media among multiple multimedia representation forms because of its impressive advantages, such as intuitive nature, rich content, low cost and rapid transmission. However, there exist many security risks in the network transmission of digital images, such as interception, malicious falsification and illegal destruction by adversaries, which may lead to immeasurable but unperceived losses [2] - [4] . Therefore, ensuring secure transmission of digital images has become an important concern of every person living with cyberspace.
Compared with textual data, image data has special characteristics, such as strong redundancy and high correlation among adjacent pixels. Therefore, the traditional encryption algorithms, such as DES, AES, and IDEA, cannot protect
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Resul Das. image data efficiently [5] , [6] . To address this challenge, many digital image encryption algorithms were proposed in the past three decades [7] . According to their essential structures, the algorithms can be classified into three classes:
• Image encryption algorithms based on pixel permutation [8] - [10] , which changes the pixel positions via a finite replacement operation on the pixel matrix, destroys the correlation of adjacent pixels, and generates unrecognized cipher images [11] . Typical permutation encryption methods include image encryption algorithms based on various affine transformations: Arnold transform, and cube transformation [7] . The pixel replacement method is simple and easy to calculate. Since the statistical characteristics of the original image are not destroyed, the resistance against statistical attacks is not effective enough.
• Image encryption algorithms based on chaotic systems [12] - [15] . Such kind of schemes utilize the ergodicity, pseudo-randomness and initial condition sensitivity of chaotic sequences to realize the diffusion and confusion requirements of a secure image encryption scheme [16] . Typical chaotic image encryption algorithms are built on all kinds of chaotic systems: Logistic map [17] - [19] , PWLCM [5] , Tent map [20] , and Henon map [21] . These methods have a large secret-key space and high security. Therefore, image encryption methods based on chaos theory received attentions of many researchers [22] , [23] .
• Bit-plane-based image encryption algorithms [24] , which decompose the pixels to the bit level and perform scrambling and spreading operations on the bit plane [25] . Representative methods include a bit-plane encryption method based on a matrix transformation [26] , a selective encryption method based on the bit-plane information distribution, and a combination of bit-level and pixel-level encryption approaches [27] . The bit-plane cryptographical operation enhances the sensitivity of the algorithm to tiny changes in the plaintext, and increases its resistance to differential attacks [28] , [29] . In addition, the permutation operation on the bit plane can change the pixel position and value at the same time, reducing the number of calculations performed by the encryption algorithm. Some bit-plane encryption algorithms can realize the ideal encryption effect via only one round of encryption. This paper focuses on security analysis and improvement of an image encryption scheme based on the extraction of binary bit planes and multiple chaotic maps (IESBC) proposed in [30] . In IESBC, the authors used multiple chaotic maps to design a chaos-based image encryption scheme at the bit level. In the permutation phase, the algorithm selected the four most significant bit-planes (MSBPs), which contains the critical information of an natural image, to perform rowcolumn permutations. Instead, the four LSBPs containing some edge information of the image are kept unchanged. In the confusion phase, the scheme used chaotic maps to generate a pseudo-random image, extracted the bit planes of the random image, and performed the XOR operation with the corresponding bit planes of the plain-image. The most important advantage of this encryption process is its high computational efficiency. However, there are security issues with IESBC: the encryption algorithm is fixed, namely the ciphertexts of the same plaintexts that are encrypted by the algorithm with the identical secret keys are exactly the same. An attacker can derive an equivalent secret key using multiple pairs of the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext. Moreover, the rows and columns of the four MSBPs of the plain-image are permuted with the same random sequence. Therefore, an adversary can identify the mathematical law of the permutation mechanism and use it to obtain the secret key. From this point of view, IESBC is not secure. We performed a known-plaintext attack and a chosen-plaintext attack on it and recover the plain-image successfully. In addition, we enhance the scheme by using a statistical value of the plain-image and a random number K , generated by a pseudo-random number generator in the diffusion phase. The number K is not transmitted as a secret key as it is not needed in the decryption process. The same plaintext is encrypted twice with the same secret key and the resulting ciphertexts are different because K is random. Therefore, our enhanced scheme is a probabilistic algorithm and can resist the proposed plaintext attacks efficiently. Experimental results and cryptographic analysis both demonstrated that the enhanced encryption scheme shows excellent performance in terms of the key space, key sensitivity, correlation analysis, information entropy, local Shannon entropy, cropping attack analysis, noise attack analysis, differential attack analysis, computational complexity analysis and speed analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II concisely reviews the encryption process of IESBC. Section III presents the cryptanalysis of IESBC against the known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. Section IV proposes an enhanced version of IESBC. Section V presents a simulation experiment and a performance analysis of the enhanced scheme. Some conclusions are presented in the last section.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE IESBC ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM A. PRELIMINARY WORK 1) BINARY BIT-PLANE EXTRACTION
An 8-bit plain-image, which is denoted by I , can be extracted as eight binary bit-planes I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I 8 , and each binary bit plane contains one bit information of the image. Binary matrixes I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , and I 4 represent the least significant bits planes (LSBPs). In contrast, matrixes I 5 , I 6 , I 7 , and I 8 represent the MSBPs [30] . Every bit plane is different in terms of the amount of contained visual information. The quantity of visual information contained in the binary bit planes is incremented from I 1 to I 8 in order. The smallest amount of information of the plain-image is presented in the bit plane LSB 1 , while the largest amount of visual information is contained in MSB 8 . The bit planes are extracted by using
where
The pixel values of the plain-image I range in [0, 255] , and those of the bit planes range in [0, 1].
2) LOGISTIC MAP
The Logistic map is simple dynamical equation exhibiting complex nonlinear behavior. Its output is highly sensitive to the initial condition and system parameters. Thus, it is often used to generate pseudo-random number sequences, especially in the field of image security. The Logistic map is expressed as
where the initial parameters are 0 and µ 0 . When µ falls in the range of (3.56995, 4), a chaotic sequence, denoted by , is obtained in the range (0, 1). Detailed dynamical analysis of the Logistic map implemented in a digital computer can be found in [20] .
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The Logistic map is highly sensitive to the value of control parameter µ. The behavior of the map changes with µ. When the value of µ is small, the mapping gradually stabilizes after a certain number of iterations. With increase of µ, the stable state is decomposed into bifurcations and becomes a twostate periodic form. Then, these states are further divided into four-state periodic forms and subsequently into eight-states [30] . Eventually, the system enters a chaotic state. The chaotic cubic-logistic map, a combination of the Logistic map and the cubic map, is defined as
where µ ∈ (1.41, 1.59) and ∈ (0, 1).
3) THE RANDOM IMAGE GENERATION
The specific steps for generating a random image in IESBC are described as follows:
• Set the initial condition and the control parameter of the chaotic Logistic map;
• Generate a random sequence R of length mn by iterating the Logistic map, where mn is the size of the plain-image I mn , and every element of R belongs to the range [0, 1];
• Transform the decimals in R into positive integers by multiplying them with a large integer θ and remove their decimal parts;
• Adopt a modulo operation P(i) = R (i) mod 256 to ensure that each value of R belongs to [0, 255] , where
• Reshape the sequence R into a two-dimensional matrix, denoted as R m×n , as the required random image.
B. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
This section describes the encryption algorithm in detail. The key steps of IESBC are described as follows:
• Extract the eight binary bit planes of the plain-image I :
• Generate a random sequence K using the chaotic cubicLogistic map, where • Generate a random image R using the chaotic Logistic map. Then extract eight binary bit planes of the random image R: R → R 1 , R 2 ,· · · , R 8 . So far, there are a total of sixteen different binary bit planes:
• Perform the XOR operation on the corresponding binary bit planes between the plaintext and the random image:
• Compose the eight manipulated planes to obtain the cipher-image C =
III. CRYPTANALYSIS A. PRELIMINARIES
A secure encryption scheme should be able to withstand all types of attacks; otherwise the encryption scheme cannot be used in secure communications [31] . Cryptographic analysis focuses on recovering the plaintext without knowing the secret key. Four common types of attacks for analyzing cryptosystem security are described as follows:
• Ciphertext-only attack (COA): The attackers do not know the cryptographic algorithm and can only analyze it based on a series of intercepted ciphertext to obtain some information of the plaintext or the secret keys.
• Known-plaintext attack (KPA): In addition to the intercepted ciphertext, the attackers have some known plaintext-ciphertext pairs for deciphering the cryptosystem.
• Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA): The attackers not only have some plaintext-ciphertext pairs but can also choose or create some specific plaintexts and obtain their corresponding ciphertexts to enhance the attacking performance.
• Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA): The attackers can choose or create some specific ciphertexts and obtain their corresponding plaintexts because they can access the decryption mechanism.
These attacks demonstrate that the goal of the attackers is to recover information regarding the plaintext and secret keys. In IESBC, the four MSBPs (I 5 , I 6 , I 7 and I 8 ) are permuted using the random sequence K successively. In contrast to another approach, in which the four planes are composed together and subsequently permuted. Those two approaches have the same effect; however, the former takes longer. IESBC can be analogized to the following process, with the key difference being that each step operates at the bit plane level rather than the pixel level: plain-image I is permuted by the random sequence K and the XOR operation is performed on the permuted image and the random image R to obtain cipher image C. Based on this analogous algorithm, the security of the encryption algorithm only depends on the random sequence K and the random image R. This encryption algorithm can be deciphered by an adversary owning K and R. In IESBC, K and R are only generated by the Logistic map and are not related to the plain-image. In addition, the LSBPs of the plain-image are not related to the MSBPs in the encryption process. Moreover, the rows and columns of the plainimage's four MSBPs (I 5 , I 6 , I 7 and I 8 ) are permuted with the same random sequence K ; therefore, the adversary can identify the mathematical law of the permutation mechanism. Besides, compared with point permutation, the row-column permutation is more likely to contain relevant information of the plain-image's neighboring pixels. These shortcomings undermine the security of IESBC and render it vulnerable to plaintext attacks.
B. KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK
In this section, we use some known plain-images I n×n and the corresponding cipher-images C n×n to break IESBC, where the random image is denoted as R n×n . As for the four LSBPs, there is only XOR operation, so R(i) = I (i) ⊕ C(i) can be obtained for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. When the attacker get another cipher image C , he can obtain the first four binary bit planes of plain-image I using
C. SIMULATION RESULTS OF KPA
In this section, we use a pair of plain-image and its corresponding cipher-image to obtain the four LSBPs of the random image in the simulation experiment. Then, we decipher two encrypted images shown in Fig 
D. CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK
In this section, we use some chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-plaintexts to decipher IESBC. First, the attacker chooses the plain-image I 0 = 0 and obtains its cipher image C since he can access the encryption mechanism. Because I 0 is a matrix of all zeros, it is unchanged by permutations. It follows that I 0 ⊕ R = C. Thus, R = C can be obtained. Hence, the binary bit planes of the random image can be extracted: R → R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R 8 . Next, the attacker chooses another plain-image I n×n and its cipher image C n×n whose binary bit planes are {I i = 0} 7 i=1 and 
The plain-image is encrypted into the cipher image C n×n whose eight binary bit planes are denoted as C 1 , C 2 , · · · , and C 8 . The XOR operations are performed on the corresponding binary bit planes between the cipher image C and the random image R:
, and D 8 are permuted from the four MSBPs of the plain-image (I 5 , I 6 , I 7 , I 8 , respectively) using the random sequence K generated by the chaotic cubic-Logistic map. The values of the random sequence K is calculated by Algorithm 1. Since the rows and columns are permuted with the same random sequence K , only one position's value equal to 1 on the diagonal line of matrix D 8 , which is permuted by I 8 (1, 1) . Suppose that the location of the diagonal entry of D 8 that equals 1 is D 8 (x, x) = 1. Then, the first row of I 8 is permuted to the x-th row of D 8 and the first column of I 8 is permuted to the x-th column of D 8 . Thus, the x-th value of the random sequence K is 1, namely K (x) = 1. Next, it is easy to show that I 8 (1, 2) is permuted to another position whose value equals 1 in the x-th row of D 8 . Suppose another location in the xth row of I 8p that equals 1 is D 8 (x, y) = 1. The yth element of the random sequence K can be obtained, namely, K (y) = 2. Similarly, all the values of the random sequence K can be obtained.
With the random sequence K and the random image R, the original plain-image can be recovered from the corresponding cipher-image. Extract the binary bit planes of the cipher image. Then, the XOR operation is performed on the corresponding binary bit planes between cipher image C and random image R: 
E. SIMULATION RESULTS OF CPA
In this section, a simulation experiment is conducted to demonstrate performance of the proposed attacks. The sim- VOLUME 7, 2019 ulation is run on a desktop PC with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6500 CPU 2.50GHz, 8GB RAM and a 500GB hard drive. The computational platform is MATLAB 8.3.0.532 (R2017a) and the operating system is Microsoft Windows 10. The concrete steps are presented as follows:
• Choose the plain-image I 0(256×256) = 0 and obtain its cipher image C 0(256×256) from the encryption mechanism. Thus, the random image R can be obtained:
• Extract the binary bit planes of the random image R → R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 , R 5 , R 6 , R 7 , and R 8 ;
• Choose another plain-image I 256×256 and obtain its cipher image C 256×256 . Eight binary bit planes of the chosen plain-image satisfy: I 1 = 0, I 2 = 0, I 3 = 0, I 4 = 0, I 5 = 0, I 6 = 0, I 7 = 0 and • Performe the XOR operation on the corresponding binary bit planes between the cipher image C and the random image R: D i = C i ⊕R i for any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 8};
• Extract the binary bit planes of the plain-image I → I 1 , · · · , I 8 ; • Input I 8 and D 8 , and the random sequence K can be calculated via Algorithm 1. Figure 2 depicts the results of the simulation experiment. (a) is the chosen plain-image of size 256 × 256, (b) is the cipher-image of (a), and (c) is the image that is recovered using the chosen-plaintext attack. Table 1 presents the performance analysis results for extracting two equivalent secret keys: R and K . We only use two special plain-images and a little time to obtain the equivalent secret keys. The computational complexity of the proposed chosen-plaintext attack is O(n) where n is the larger of the height and width of the known plain-image.
IV. ENHANCED ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM A. SHORTCOMINGS OF IESBC
The key shortcomings of IESBC are summarized as follows:
• Sequences K and R are only generated by the Logistic map and the encryption process does not involve the statistical characteristics of the plain-image.
• The rows and columns of the plain-image's four MSBPs (I 5 , I 6 , I 7 and I 8 ) are permuted with the same random sequence K ; therefore, the adversaries can identify the mathematical law of the permutation mechanism.
• This algorithm can only be applied to square plainimages due to the use of the same random sequence K , which is not applicable to non-square images.
• Compared with a point permutation, a row-column permutation is more likely to preserve relevant information of the plain-image's neighboring pixels.
• When performing the XOR operation, this algorithm simply operates on the corresponding bit plane. The LSBPs of the plain-image are not related to the MSBPs in the encryption process. Our enhanced encryption scheme is able to encrypt rectangular plain-images. It performs point permutations instead of row-column permutations in the permutation phase to reduce the correlation of the plain-image's neighboring pixels. In the confusion phase, each position of the LSBs plane is closely related to the same position on the MSBs plane and possesses the statistical characteristics of the plain-image. Moreover, we introduce a random number K , which is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. The same plaintext is encrypted twice with the same secret key and the resulting cipher-texts are different because K is random. Thus, it is sufficiently secure against all types of attacks. Our enhanced encryption and decryption algorithms are described as follows.
B. ENCRYPTION
Assume that the original plain-image is I m×n . The encryption steps are presented as follows: If there is a duplicate value in the generated sequence S , only the first is retained. Therefore, we should generate more than mn values in S to ensure that the length of S is mn after the removal of the duplicate values. Then, we apply the modulo operation to scale the values of the random sequence as follows: S = S mod mn, R L = R L mod 2 4 , and R M = R M mod 2 4 ;
• Transform I L m×n and I M m×n into one-dimensional vectors V L 1×mn and V M 1×mn , respectively, and permute V M 1×mn to V MP 1×mn with the random sequences S;
• Encrypt V L 1×mn and V MP 1×mn to make them interrelated and obtain corresponding cipher-texts V L 1×mn and V MP 1×mn by setting
for any i ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , mn − 1}, where
and
K is a random number generated by a pseudo-random number generator such that K ∈ (−∞, +∞);
• Use the two corresponding planes C L m×n and C MP m×n to compose the final cipher image C m×n .
This encryption scheme is mainly used for gray-scale images, and it can also encrypt color images. For an RGB color image, the scheme decomposes the plain-image into R, G and B components, encrypts each channel separately and then combine them together to form the final cipher image.
C. DECRYPTION
Assume that the ciphertext image is C m×n . The decryption steps are described as follows: 
where i = 1, 2, · · · , mn − 1;
• Permute V MP 1×mn to V M 1×mn with the random sequences S;
• Reshape 1D vectors V L 1×mn and V M 1×mn to matrices I L m×n and I M m×n , which have m rows and n columns;
• Use the two corresponding binary bit planes I L m×n and I M m×n to compose the final plain-image I m×n .
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON A. RESISTANCE TO THE KNOWN-PLAINTEXT AND CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
In IESBC, ciphertexts of the same plaintexts encrypted via the algorithm with identical secret keys are exactly the same; hence, it is a fixed algorithm. An attacker can derive an equivalent secret key from multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In our enhanced scheme, a random number K generated by a pseudo-random number generator in the encryption process.
Since K is not needed in decryption, K is not transmitted as a secret key. Therefore, our enhanced scheme is a probabilistic algorithm. If the same plaintext is encrypted twice with the same secret keys, the resulting ciphertexts will be different because K is random. Besides, the enhanced scheme extract an intrinsic feature of the plain-image in diffusion process. Due to the relation mechanism between the LSBs plane and the MSBs plane, each position of those planes can be affected by the statistical characteristics of the plain-image. Therefore, our enhanced scheme can resist the known-plaintext attack and the chosen-plaintext attack effectively.
B. EXPERIMENTS OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION
This section presents experimental results for the enhanced algorithm. We set the original parameters and initial conditions as µ 1 = 1.45, x 1 0 = 0.3, and l 1 = 10mn + 1000 to obtain S; set µ 2 = 1.49, x 2 0 = 0.1, and l 2 = mn + 1000 to obtain R L ; and set µ 3 = 1.52, x 3 0 = 0.2, and l 3 = mn + 1000 to obtain R M . Fig. 3(a) depicts the plain-image ''Lena'' of size 256 × 256, and its histogram is shown in (d). Fig. 3(b) shows the encrypted image obtained via the enhanced algorithm and its histogram is demonstrated in Fig. 3(e) . According to the histogram of the cipher image, the pixel distribution is highly uniform and has satisfactory statistical properties. Fig. 3 (c) and (f) presents the decrypted image and its histogram, respectively. 
C. KEY SPACE
A secure encryption algorithm should have a sufficiently large key space to resist the brute-force attack. When we evaluate a secure encryption algorithm, the key space is typically larger than 2 100 [32] , [33] . In the enhanced scheme, the key space can be calculated from the parameters µ 1 , µ 2 , and µ 3 and the initial values x 1 0 , x 2 0 , and x 3 0 of the chaotic cubic-Logistic map. Assuming the accuracy range of a floating-point number is 10 −14 , the key space is of size (10 14 ) 6 = 10 84 , which well exceeds 2 100 . Therefore, the enhanced encryption algorithm is sufficiently secure for resisting the brute-force attack. Table 2 shows the key space comparisons of different encryption schemes. As can be seen, the key space of our enhanced scheme is larger than that of some existing scheme, such as Ref. [30] , [34] - [37] .
D. KEY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A good encryption scheme should be highly sensitive to the secret keys in both the encryption process and decryption process. To test the key sensitivity in encryption part, the original keys K 0 = (µ 1 = 1.45,
2) are added a slight disturbance 10 −14 to construct two slightly different keys
Then the same plain-image ''Lena'' is encrypted independently using K 0 , K 1 , K 2 . The encrypted images are shown in Fig. 4(a)-(c) , respectively. The different pixels between the original cipher image encrypted by K 0 and two changed cipher images encrypted independently by K 1 , K 2 account for 99.5758% and 99.5941% of the total ones, respectively. This means that the same plain-image can generate totally different cipher images using slight different keys. In decryption part, the original cipher-image (Fig. 4(a) ) is decrypted independently using K 0 , K 1 , K 2 . The decipher images are shown in Fig. 4(d)-(f) , respectively. As can be seen, plain-image can only be recovered with the correct key K 0 ; otherwise, the process will completely fail although decrypting with a tiny disturbed key. Conclusively, the above two experiments demonstrate that our enhanced scheme is extremely sensitive to the secret keys in encryption and decryption processes.
E. CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Two neighboring pixel pairs of a natural image always have a high correlation degree. An effective encryption scheme is expected to substantially reduce the correlation information of the cipher image to resist the statistical analysis attacks. We randomly select 2000 neighboring pixels in the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions in the plain-image and the encrypted image and calculate their correlation degree by
, where x, y are two neighboring pixels in different directions, Figure 5 shows the correlation of the plain-image ''Lena'' and its cipher-image. The correlations of the encrypted image are random-like. Table 3 compares the correlations of different encryption schemes. The results demonstrate that the enhanced algorithm yields a lower correlation coefficient after encryption.
F. DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK ANALYSIS
The basic strategy of differential cryptanalysis is to obtain the largest possible keys by analyzing the impact of the specific plaintext difference on the corresponding ciphertext difference. Typically, the attackers make a tiny change in the plaintext and compare the corresponding ciphertext pairs with the difference in the plaintext. The number of pixels change rate and unified average changing intensity (13) are used to evaluate the strength of the encryption scheme against the differential attacks, where
m and n are the height and width of the plain-image and C, C are two cipher-images [39] . For resisting a differential attack, the best theoretical score of UACI is 0.33 and that of NPCR is 1. We select plain-image ''Lena'' and then change one bit of the pixel value in different positions. Then, we encrypt these plain-images with the same keys and calculate the NPCR and UACI scores of the encrypted image via Eq. (12) . Table 4 lists the NPCR and UACI scores when a pixel value is changed.
The NPCR values are always equal to the ideal value of 1, and the UACI values are close to the ideal value of 0.33. Hence, the enhanced scheme is highly sensitive to tiny changes in the plain-image: even if the two encrypted plain-images differ in only one bit, the two decrypted images will be entirely different. Table 5 compares the NPCR and UACI scores for different encryption schemes on some typical images. It is clear that the enhanced scheme obtains better scores. Thus, the proposed encryption scheme performs well in terms of robustness against the differential attacks.
G. INFORMATION ENTROPY ANALYSIS
For a cryptosystem, the information entropy is used to assess the randomness of the encrypted image. The information entropy of an image I is defined as
where I i is the ith gray value of I and P(I i ) is the probability of I i [40] . For a truly random 8-bit image, the ideal information entropy value is 8. If a well-performing encryption algorithm is utilized, the cipher image is typically as random as possible; hence, the cipher image does not reveal any useful information to attackers. via the enhanced scheme exceed those encrypted via other schemes, which indicates the enhanced scheme can protect information better.
H. LOCAL SHANNON ENTROPY ANALYSIS
Local Shannon entropy is usually used to measure the randomness of encrypted images. In [41] , Local Shannon entropy is defined as
where S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S k are non-overlapping image blocks selected randomly from encrypted images, and each block has T B pixels. For i = 1 ∼ k, H (S i ) denotes the Shannon entropy for the image block S i , which are computed by Eq. (14) . We encrypted the test images using our enhanced scheme and then calculate the local Shonnon entropy of the encrypted images. Table 7 presents the local entropy values where K = 30 and T B = 1936. According to [41] , [42] , the interval of (30, 1936 )-local Shannon entropy of a random image should be between [7.901901305, 7 .903037329] with confidence α = 0.05. From Table 7 , it is obvious that all the cipher images have passed local Shannon entropy test, which means the encrypted images generated by our enhanced scheme have good randomness.
I. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST THE CROPPING ATTACKS AND NOISE ATTACKS
The goal of cropping attack analysis is to determine whether the encrypted images can be deciphered when it is incom- plete. And the noise attack analysis can assess the robustness of the encrypted image affected by noise in real-time transmission. We selected three encrypted images that have been cropped by 25% (Fig. 6(a) ), 50% ( Fig. 6(b) ), 75% ( Fig. 6(c) ) and one encrypted images added a salt-andpepper noise with signal noise rate 0.1 ( Fig. 6(d) ) and then decrypt them via the enhanced scheme using the correct secret keys respectively. Fig. 6 (e-h) show the corresponding decrypted images. We perform a simple median filtering process on the decrypted image respectively. Fig. 6 (i-l) show the corresponding filtered images. The results demonstrate that the decrypted images can be recognized when the encrypted images are subjected to the cropping attacks and noise attacks. Even if the encrypted images have been cropped by 75%, the outline of the decrypted image can still be recognized visually. Thus, the enhanced encryption scheme has good robustness against the cropping attacks and noise attacks.
J. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
For an encryption algorithm, the computational complexity is another important evaluation index. In this section, we compare the computational complexity of our enhanced scheme with that of other encryption algorithms. The size of plainimage is denoted as m × n. In [34] , there are three steps in the encryption process, that is permutation, diffusion and permutation, and the number of operations are mn, 9mn, and mn, respectively. Thus, its total computational complexity is 11mn. In [38] , the diffusion part includes DNA encoding, DNA decoding and two XOR operations. Besides, there is also a permutation after diffusion. Thus, the total number of operations are 5mn. In [35] , the encryption process has only one simple XOR operation, so its complexity is mn. However, it is highly insecure. The encryption process of [30] is performed at bit level, and the number of operations in permutation and diffusion are 4m + 4n and 8mn, respectively. In our enhanced scheme, the encryption process is divided into two parts. The permutation of MSBs plane has the computation complexity mn. Besides, The confusion part includes a relation mechanism and XOR operations, whose computational complexity is 2mn. In general, the number of operations of the entire enhanced algorithm is 3mn, which depends on the size of the plain-image.
K. SPEED ANALYSIS
In this section, we measure the encryption speed and decryption speed of our enhanced algorithm on image ''Lena'' of size 256×256. Our experiments are run on the compiler platform of MATLAB 8.3.0.532 (R2017a) with 8GB RAM and a 2.50GHz preprocessor. Table 8 lists the execution times of different encryption schemes. As can be seen, the encryption speed of our enhanced scheme is sufficiently fast to meet realtime performance requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the security performance of an image encryption scheme based on bit-plane extraction and multiple chaotic maps. Based on the identified security defects, we proposed efficient know-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks for recovering some information of the original plainimage. Furthermore, we revised the defects of IESBC via multiple modifications: adopting a statistical value of the plain-image in the diffusion phase; building a relation mechanism between each position of the LSBs plane with the corresponding position in the MSBs plane to reduce the correlation among neighboring pixels of the plain-image; and utilizing a random number source making IESBC compose a probabilistic algorithm and can resist the plaintext attacks efficiently. In all, this paper provides a new way to enhance an insecure image encryption scheme.
